This study examines whether board of director's independence, financial expertise, gender, corporate governance experience and diligence impact the audit report lag exhibited by Australian publicly listed firms. Using a pooled sample of 500 firm-year observations obtained from the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 2004 to 2008, this study finds evidence that board member independence, board member financial expertise and, to a lesser extent, board member corporate governance experience are the most significant predictors associated with shorter/reduced audit report lag. Main findings are robust to alternative measures of audit report lag, board characteristics and control variables. Findings from this study clearly imply that boards play a substantial role in reducing audit report lag. Results imply that legislative and regulatory requirements, both in Australian and overseas, stipulating board member independence and financial expertise requirements are effective in improving the integrity of financial reporting, a key component of which is timeliness of financial reporting (encapsulated by audit report lag). In addition, an additional board characteristic that regulators should consider promoting among firms is board member corporate governance experience. Results from this study, therefore, have clear implications not only for regulators but also for key stakeholders such shareholders and management.
Introduction
The overarching objective of this study is to determine whether board of director (board) characteristics impact the audit report lag [9] of Australian publicly listed firms. Importantly, this study seeks to investigate which specific characteristics of boards are effective in reducing audit report lag and, thereby, increasing the timeliness of the audit report. For the purposes of this study, the five board characteristics examined are board independence, financial expertise, gender, corporate governance experience and diligence.
Financial reports are an important medium that provide a wide range of users with quality information which assist users with decision-making processes and investment decisions, a fundamental feature of properly functioning capital markets (Holland and Johanson 2003) . Establishing the confidence of users/investors requires financial reports to be both reliable and timely. Apart from other financial 9 Audit report lag refers to the number of days from the end of the financial year to the date of the audit report for a firm. The audit report lag actually consists of two components: firm delay in preparing the financial statements for audit; and the audit firm delay in completing the statutory audit (Afify 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan 2011) . Being able to measure both firm delay and audit firm delay could lead potentially to more informative analysis but the necessary data is not available given the proposed study's methodology.
information such as periodic announcements, specifically earnings, audited financial reports are likely to be the most reliable source of information available to the market as a whole (Givoly and Palmon 1982; Habib and Bhuiyan 2011) . Delayed disclosure of an auditor's opinion on the truth and fairness of financial reports prepared by firms exacerbates information asymmetry and increases uncertainly in investment decisions. In turn, the delayed disclosure can thus adversely affect investor confidence in the capital market.
After the corporate collapses of Enron, WorldCom and global auditing firm Arthur Andersen, the United States of America (US) passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002 in an attempt to increase the quality of financial reporting. Investors in corporate Australia also faced similar large-scale commercial failures namely: HIH Insurance, Harris Scarfe, One.Tel and Ansett. The Australian government also responded to the deterioration in the quality of financial reporting by implementing the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program, specifically CLERP 9 (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill of 2004. The global financial collapses and resulting allegations of accounting impropriety by firms resulted in widespread calls for accounting reform in an attempt to increase the quality of financial reporting by firms. Timeliness of financial reporting is one key component underpinning quality of financial reporting. Givoly and Palmon (1982) [10] assert that audit report lag is the single most important determinant of timeliness in earnings announcement affecting the market reaction to earnings announcements. Given the importance of audit timeliness to investors, identifying the determinants of audit report lag is important for two reasons: first, such determinants increase the understanding of the audit process (Bamber, Bamber, and Schoderbek 1993); and second, audit report lag is directly associated with the timeliness of announcements of firm earnings (Givoly and Palmon 1982) .
Currently, a limited but growing amount of empirical literature has examined audit report lag. The majority of such literature has concentrated on the influence of firm-specific and audit quality factors hypothesised to impact audit report lag (Afify 2009 A comprehensive review of the literature on boards and financial reporting by Bedard and Gendron (2010) suggests that none of the prior literature has investigated the association between boards and timeliness of financial reporting. [11] This gap in the literature provides the motivation for investigating the board-audit report lag linkage in this study. Examining the board-audit report lag linkage is also important given that, under existing regulations both in Australia and in a number of other countries, boards are charged with establishing a system of risk oversight and internal control and laying foundations for management and overall oversight. (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2007). Specifically, Recommendation 7.1 of Principle 7 of the ASX Corporate Governance and Recommendations issued by the ASX Corporate Governance Council stipulates that the board is responsible for identifying, assessing, monitoring and managing risks (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2007). Part of the board's overall responsibility is the need to monitor the audit committee, a sub-committee charged with ensuring the integrity of financial reporting by the firm (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2007). Effective boards, therefore, would reduce audit report lag as part of the board's responsibilities for risk management including the integrity of financial reports produced by firms.
This study makes an original contribution to the existing literature in that this is the first study examining five oft-cited important individual board characteristics and their association with audit report lag within a capital market setting. Results from this study will have important implications not only for regulators in legislating the optimum composition of boards but also more importantly for key stakeholders particularly shareholders who have the responsibility to appoint and discharge directors of the board.
Using a pooled sample of 500 firm-year observations obtained from the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) for the period 2004 to 2008, this study finds evidence that, in terms of the five board characteristics examined, board independence, financial expertise and, to a lesser extent, corporate 10 Studies show that the timeliness of an earnings announcement is related to stock prices and that firms that announce their earnings early are viewed positively (Chambers and Penman 1984; Kross and Schroeder 1984 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section Two reviews the literature on the relationship between boards and audit report lag leading to this study's hypotheses. Section Three outlines the data and research methodology, with Section Four reporting descriptive statistics and correlations. Section Five provides details of the main results and sensitivity tests undertaken. Section Six concludes by summarising the findings and discussing the implications from the results. Limitations of this study and suggestions for future research are also provided at the end of Section Six.
Literature review and hypotheses development
The timely release of financial information by firms is an important aspect of financial reporting by firms. Given the fundamental role that financial reporting plays in the information marketplace and in the investment decisions made by users, audit report lag jeopardises the quality of financial information by not providing such timely information to users. [12] The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) requires all public firms that are not disclosing entities or limited by guarantee to prepare annual audited financial reports and have the reports lodged with ASIC within four months of the firms' financial year-end (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 1994). Since the audit report contains the auditor's opinion regarding the credibility of the financial statements, investors generally prefer shorter audit report lags because the earlier investors receive the audit opinion, the sooner investors can adjust their investment preferences. A long audit report lag suggests a delay in the release of earnings information to investors and therefore decreases the informational efficiency of the market -an issue of considerable concern to regulators. Clearly, therefore, audit report lag is an important component of quality financial reporting.
Corporate governance is a control feature within firms to safeguard against opportunistic behaviour by reconciling the interests and expectations of shareholders and management (Fama and Jensen 1983) . Additionally, effective corporate governance mechanisms within firms not only serve as a monitor (of management) but also serve to assure the quality of reported earnings. A large body of prior literature has shown that weak corporate governance structures lead to poor financial reporting quality, earnings manipulation, financial statement fraud and weaker internal control (Abbott et . [13] Given the need for boards to comply with Principle 2 titled -Structure to Add Value‖ and Principle 4 titled -Safeguard Integrity in Financial Reporting‖ of the ASX's Corporate Governance Council (CGC) (specifically Recommendations 2.1 and 4.1 which stipulates the need for properlystructured boards to monitor the integrity of the firm's financial reporting), clearly boards play an instrumental role in the quality of reported earnings/financial information produced by firms (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2007). It is apparent, therefore, that boards play a pivotal role in ensuring the integrity of financial reporting by firms. Given that audit report lag is an important component of quality financial reporting, the proposed study seeks to analyse another strand of the corporate governance-earnings quality linkage by investigating the role of the board in the timely release of financial reporting by firms (the latter proxied by audit report lag).
Effective corporate governance mechanisms within firms are expected to reduce audit report lag because of: (1) closer monitoring of management preparing the financial statements; (2) greater interaction with the external auditor charged with the statutory audit of the financial statements; and (3) liaising with an internal audit function also responsible for risk management (including internal controls over the financial reporting process. One noteworthy characteristic of past literature on audit report lag relates to the explanatory power of the audit report lag models which is modest at the 20% -30% range (given that the predictor variables essentially relate to firm characteristics and audit quality). The low explanatory power of past studies, therefore, provides an opportunity to identify new variables not previously identified to formulate a more complete audit report lag model. Interestingly, Afify (2009), more recently, included corporate governance characteristics of firms in Egypt and reported a significantly higher adjusted R 2 of 57%. Afify's (2009) results, therefore, provide additional motivation to this study seeking to examining a wider range of corporate governance features (specifically board features) postulated to impact audit report lag.
Board characteristics and audit report lag
It is postulated that specific board characteristics reinforce the effectiveness of that board thereby increasing the timeliness of financial reporting (by reducing the audit report lag exhibited by firms). There is a large quantity of literature which suggests that boards comprising a majority of independent directors are more likely to improve the financial reporting quality of firms by hiring high-quality auditors, employing an internal audit function within the firm, increasing audit committee effectiveness and engaging in higher levels of accounting conservatism ( Given, therefore, that board characteristics positively influence the quality of financial reporting by firms, this study's main hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
Data and research methodology
The following sub-sections provide details of the sample selected, source documentation, measurement details for all the variables in this study and specify the statistical models utilised to formally test the hypothesis of this study.
Sample selection
The analysis in this study involves a longitudinal examination covering a five calendar-year period The initial sample comprises all publicly listed firms listed on the ASX as at January 1, 2004. ASX listed firms are chosen because information on such firms are publicly available. Consistent with prior research, a number of exclusions are made. From the resulting sample pool, 100 firms are randomly selected for each year based on market capitalization. [14] Specifically, a stratified-random approach is used to capture the overall picture of the market as a whole, and thereby, to generalize findings by avoiding potential firm size biases. The stratified-random approach will involve stratifying each year into quartiles by market capitalization and randomly selecting a sample of 25 firms within each quartile (Balvers, Cosimano, and McDonald 1990). Each calendar year (i.e., January 1 to December 31) within the observation period is considered an individual firm-year for firms included in the sample. Data is collected for each firm selected from each firm-year covered in this study. The resulting pooled sample, therefore, provides 500 firm-year observations for use as data points in the subsequent testing. 
Measurement of key variables
Audit report lag (dependent variable denoted and tabulated as ARL) is operationalized as the difference (in number of days) between the financial year-end of a firm and the date of that firm's audit report. The key predictor board characteristics examined in the study are board independence, financial expertise, gender, corporate governance experience and diligence which are defined as follows: 1) board independence is measured as the percentage of independent directors on the board of the firm (denoted BOD_%Ind). For the purposes of this study, the definition adopted for board member independence is consistent with Recommendation 2.1 of Principle 2 of the ASX Corporate Governance and Recommendations (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2007); 2) financial expertise is measured as the percentage of directors on the board of the firm who are classified as financial experts (denoted BOD_%Fin_Expt). For the purposes of this study, the definition adopted for financial expertise is consistent with (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007b); 3) gender is measured by the presence of at least one woman on the directors on the board (denoted BOD_D_Gender); 4) corporate governance experience is measured as the percentage of directors on the board of the firm who are on the boards of other firms (denoted BOD_%CG_Exp); and 5) diligence is proxied by the total number of board meetings held during the year (denoted BOD_Dil).
14 Since one of the major drivers of firm performance is the need to maximise shareholder value, this measure is best reflected by the market capitalisation of a firm (Balvers, Cosimano, and McDonald 1990).
To minimize cross-sectional influences, a number of control variables are incorporated into the analysis. [15] Prior research suggests that firm features and audit quality may influence audit report lag (Afify 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan 2011; Leventis, Weetman, and Caramanis 2005). As such, control variables proxying for firm features such as firm size (proxied by assets) and firm risk (proxied by leverage) and audit quality (proxied by a Big4 auditor) are also included in the multivariate testing. Past literature also indicates that the industry a firm is in can also impact the degree of audit report lag exhibited by that firm (Habib and Bhuiyan 2011; Mohamad-Nor, Shafie, and Wan-Hussin 2010). Consequently, firms are categorised into two industries: firms in either the materials or industrials industries and firms in the remaining industries consistent with Stein, Simunic and O'Keefe (1994). Sensitivity analysis is undertaken to determine the validity of the main results. Alterative measures of the dependent, independent and control variables are formulated and regression results re-run.
Statistical tests and models
This study uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to analyse the relationship between board features and audit report lag. The hypothesis of this study is tested formally by using a pooled regression model. The main regression model is specified below in Equation 1:
ARL=β 0 + β 1 BOD_%Ind + β 2 BOD_%Fin_Expt + β 3 BOD_D_Gender + β 4 BOD_%CG_Exp + β 5 BOD_Dil + β 6 Big4 + β 7 LnAssets+ β 8 Leverage + β 9 Industry_Mats_Ind + ε
Where: ARL = Represents the number of days elapsing between the end of the financial year of a firm and the date of the audit report for that firm. 
Big4
= A firm is scored one (1) if during the year the incumbent auditor is a Big-4 audit firm; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0). LnAssets = Natural logarithm of total assets for a firm at the end of the financial year. Leverage = Total debt divided by total equity for a firm at the end of the financial year. Industry_Mats_Ind A firm is scored one (1) if during the year the firm is either in the materials or industrials industry; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0). β = Coefficients on variables 0 through 9. ε = The error term.
Empirical results

Descriptive statistics
Panel A Table 1 Where: ARL = the number of days elapsing between the end of the financial year of a firm and the date of the audit report for that firm; BOD_%Ind = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year at least 50% of the directors on the board are independent; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); BOD_%Fin_Expt = Percentage of directors on the board of the firm who are classified as financial experts; BOD_%CG_Exp = Percentage of directors on the board of the firm who are on the boards of other firms; BOD_Dil = The total number of board meetings held during the year; Assets = Total assets for a firm at the end of the financial year; Leverage = Total debt divided by total equity for a firm at the end of the financial year; BOD_D_Gender = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year at least one of the directors on the board is a woman; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); Big4 = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year the incumbent auditor is a Big-4 audit firm; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); Industry_Mats_Ind = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year the firm is either in the materials or industrials industry; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0).
Panel B, which reports the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous variables utilised in this study, suggests that, in terms of gender, only 113 firms (23%) have at least one woman on the board. In terms of the type of auditor appointed, 284 (57%) of the firms in the sample employ a Big4 auditor (Big4) and finally, 249 (50%) of the pooled firms in the final usable sample were in either the materials or industrials industry. Table 3 presents a correlation matrix reporting Pearson listwise correlation coefficients for all the variables utilised in this study. A review of the correlation coefficients indicates that audit report lag is shorter for all of the variables of this study except for firms with high levels of leverage. The latter result is unsurprising given that firms with high levels of debt ordinarily attract greater audit attention and effort by incumbent auditors resulting in longer periods of audit report lag (Andersen, Mansi, and Reeb 2003). Specifically, a review of Table 3 also reveals that, on a bivariate basis, audit report lag is significantly negatively associated with the percentage of independent board members, gender, members with corporate governance experience and firm assets. The correlational relationship between the natural logarithm of firm assets and percentage of independent board members is high at 51.5% but does not approach or exceed the critical multicollinearity limit of 80% (Hair et al. 2006) . At this stage, therefore, based on the Pearson listwise correlations, standard interpretations of the univariate coefficients in Table  3 can be made and multivariate testing can be undertaken with confidence. Where: ARL = the number of days elapsing between the end of the financial year of a firm and the date of the audit report for that firm; BOD_%Ind = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year at least 50% of the directors on the board are independent; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); BOD_%Fin_Expt = Percentage of directors on the board of the firm who are classified as financial experts; BOD_D_Gender = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year at least one of the directors on the board is a woman; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); BOD_%CG_Exp = Percentage of directors on the board of the firm who are on the boards of other firms; BOD_Dil = The total number of board meetings held during the year; Big4 = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year the incumbent auditor is a Big-4 audit firm; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); LnAssets = Natural logarithm of total assets for a firm at the end of the financial year; Leverage = Total debt divided by total equity for a firm at the end of the financial year; Industry_Mats_Ind = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year the firm is either in the materials or industrials industry; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0).
Correlations
Note: **, * represent correlations significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively (two-tailed). Where: BOD_%Ind = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year at least 50% of the directors on the board are independent; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); BOD_%Fin_Expt = Percentage of directors on the board of the firm who are classified as financial experts; BOD_D_Gender = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year at least one of the directors on the board is a woman; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); BOD_%CG_Exp = Percentage of directors on the board of the firm who are on the boards of other firms; BOD_Dil = The total number of board meetings held during the year; BOD_D_Ind = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year at least 50% of the directors on the board are independent; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); BOD_D_Fin_Expt = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year at least one of the directors on the board is classified as a financial expert; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); BOD_D_CG_Exp = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year at least one of the directors on the board is on the board of another firm; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); BOD_D_Dil = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year the total number of board meetings held were at least seven; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); Big4 = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year the incumbent auditor is a Big-4 audit firm; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0); LnAssets = Natural logarithm of total assets for a firm at the end of the financial year; Leverage = Total debt divided by total equity for a firm at the end of the financial year; and Industry_Mats_Ind = A firm is scored one (1) if during the year the firm is either in the materials or industrials industry; otherwise the firm is scored zero (0).
Note: ***, **, * represent correlations significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed).
For the purposes of brevity, year-indicator variables have not been tabulated in Columns 2 and 3 report results regressing five board characteristics against audit report lag. A number of significant relationships arise on a multivariate basis as a result of the OLS regression completed. Results clearly indicate that firms with boards comprising a majority of independent members, with at least one board member having financial expertise and (to a lesser extent) a majority of board members with corporate governance experience (by being on the boards of other firms) have shorter audit report lags than boards without such board characteristics. It is also noteworthy that firms with boards comprising women members and boards which meet more often do not have any statistical association with audit report lag. On balance, therefore, H 1 is accepted. With respect to control variables, Table 4 indicates that larger firms tend to have shorter audit report lag compared to smaller firms suggesting that larger firms have greater resources enabling formulation and implementation (by such large firms) of procedures, processes and internal control systems to minimise risks/errors thus enabling external auditors to complete their audit quickly. Added to this is reputational capital that large firms value thus necessitating an expeditious audit by such firms. In terms of the adjusted R 2 , main results in Columns 2 and 3 in Table  4 have predictive abilities comparable with past studies. Specifically, past studies concentrating solely on firm and audit-specific characteristics have produced models with predictive abilities in the range of 20% to 30% ( Results from this study are a considerable improvement over prior studies in that the main model adopted has an adjusted R 2 of 39%, a significant enhancement over previous studies utilising only firm and auditspecific characteristics. Clearly, boards play a statistical significant role in reducing audit report lag.
Sensitivity testing
Sensitivity analysis was undertaken to validate the main results. Initially, an alternative measure of the dependent variable, audit report lag, was determined and the main regression results re-run. In line with Bamber, Bamber and Schoderbek (1993), the alternative variable, abnormal audit report lag, is calculated as the difference between the firm's audit report lag and the firm's median audit report lag where the latter median is calculated over the observation window. Abnormal audit report lag is then regressed against the five board characteristics examined in this study to determine if the main results are affected by the choice of measure for audit report lag. Results from sensitivity analysis using the alternative measure of audit report lag did not change the directionality and significance of the main results. As indicated in Section 5.1, Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 report the results of sensitivity testing by utilising entirely dichotomous measures to capture the board characteristics of interest in this study. Results from sensitivity testing continue to highlight similar significant relationships on a multivariate basis. Results clearly indicate that firms with boards comprising more than 50% independent members, with at least one board member having financial expertise and more than 50% board members with corporate governance experience have shorter audit report lags than boards without similar characteristics. It is also salient that firms with boards comprising women members and boards which meet more often continue not to have any statistical association with audit report lag. In terms of the adjusted R 2 , sensitivity results in Columns 4 and 5 in Table 4 have predictive abilities better than main results (40% compared to 39%). In conclusion, comprehensive sensitivity testing completed fully support main results.
Conclusions
This study investigates whether board features impact the audit report lag of Australian publicly listed firms. The five individual board variables examined in this study are board independence, financial expertise, gender, corporate governance experience and diligence. This study seeks to determine which board characteristics are effective in reducing audit report lag and, thereby, increasing the timeliness of the audit report. Using a pooled sample of 500 firm-year observations obtained from the ASX from 2004 to 2008, this study finds evidence that board member independence, board member financial expertise and, to a lesser extent, board member corporate governance experience are the most important predictors associated with shorter audit report lag. Overall main findings are robust to alternative measures of audit report lag, the five predictor variables and control variables. Findings from this study, therefore, clearly imply that boards play a substantial role in reducing audit report lag.
In terms of implications, results indicate that existing legislative and regulatory requirements, both in Australian and overseas, requiring board member independence and financial expertise are effective in improving the integrity of financial reporting, a key component of which is timeliness of financial reporting (encapsulated by audit report lag). However, another board characteristic that regulators should consider legislating (as a direct result of findings from this study) is board member corporate governance experience. Given that results suggest board members with corporate governance experience are associated with firms exhibiting shorter audit report lag (and therefore increased timeliness of financial reporting), regulators and legislators should consider recommending/promoting the appointment of directors to firms with multiple directorships and, therefore, increased corporate governance experience.
Results from this study are subject to limitations. This study has examined only five director characteristics hypothesised to impact audit report lag. While the five director characteristics selected are the most commonly used and cited in prior empirical literature ( , there may also be other variables excluded potentially impacting on audit report lag. Future research can examine the impact of other corporate governance mechanisms thought to potentially impact audit report lag such as audit committees and internal auditors. In addition, the association between audit report lag and other financial measures such as earnings management and cost of equity/debt can also be undertaken.
